A collaborative interest model of relational coordination: Examining relational norms as actor bonds by Medlin, C. & Quester, P.
1A Collaborative Interest Model of Relational Coordination:
Examining Relational Norms as Actor Bonds
by
Medlin, C.J.* and Quester, P.G.
School of Commerce, Adelaide University, AUSTRALIA 5005
Abstract
An important aspect of business-to-business marketing involves the development over time of
privileged bonds between firms. Research has identified the complexity of such bonds and
emphasised the need for closer scrutiny of the different mechanisms at work in successful and
mutually beneficial business relationships.
Actor intention and actor bonds are structured as a complex amalgam of self and collective
interest. Firms cooperate for self-interest and in that process generate relational norms whose
structure can be represented as actor bonds.
In this study, a longitudinal input-process-output model of relationships is proposed. Input by
firms motivated to create relationships is driven by the need to access customers or resources.
This desire to operate in a relationship leads firms to coordinate themselves through a process
whereby relational norms are developed and finally, output is achieved at a relationship level.
That output is conceptualised at a relationship level recognises the emergent results of
interaction, an essential reason for joining any relationship.
The model was empirically tested in the computer software industry with a survey of firms
acting as principals and distributors in a number of existing distribution relationships.
Our findings, based on regression analysis, suggest that self and collective interest result in an
intriguing blend of relational norms. The proposition that self-interest is not linked to trust
and commitment is supported, suggesting that relational coordination is primarily based on
collective interest. However, the proposition that flexibility is linked to both self and
collective interest is also supported. This suggests that the degree of flexibility found in
relationships may reflect the continuing need of balancing self and collective interests.
The final section of the paper proposes directions for future research on the intertwining of
self and collective interest in relationships, along with their associations to actor bond
structure that is configured as relational norms.
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2Introduction
Business relationships operate through time with three aspects interacting (Håkansson and
Snehota, 1995). First, firms interact with their relationship according to their intentions and
self-interest. Second, the firms coordinate with each other within the relationship. Third, the
relationship interacts with the wider network to arrive at strategic and performance outcomes
for the relationship and so the participating firms.
Within the IMP Group it is argued that actors, resources and activities, collectively with their
analogues at the relationship and network level, shape relationships and networks (Håkansson
and Snehota, 1995). However, an alternate view is that actor intention and actor bonds, along
with their reciprocal conditioning effects, are the most important factors shaping the long-
term nature of interaction in networks of firms (Medlin and Quester, 1999). Briefly, actor
bonds, actor intentions and their reciprocal ‘conditioning’ shape a firm’s understanding of
environmental events or change arising from the firms in the relationship. Furthermore, this
interpretation of events informs on the optimal strategies and tactics available to the firm and
the relationship in response to any change. Thus, the nature of the present relationship
emerges from interaction between past actor bonds and firm intentions as well as
consideration of future orientations of these aspects of relationships.
The pre-eminence of actor bonds, actor intentions and their reciprocal conditioning in
explaining relationship and network dynamics leads to four implications. First, the attributes
of actor bonds should be broadened to include other elements besides trust and commitment.
Second, the concept of actor intention requires some elaboration, for relationships are
inherently composed of an amalgam of self and collective interest (Young and Wilkinson
1997). Third, an explanation of the ‘conditioning’ effect of actor bonds and intentions on each
other is required. Finally, examination of actor bonds and intentions requires a contextual
setting that recognises their role in relationships.
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following manner. First, each of the
implications suggested above is discussed. Second, a collaborative interest model of
relational coordination based on a mixture of self and collective interest is proposed. Third, a
methodology for examining the model is described and the results of hypotheses testing are
presented. Finally, the areas for future research are reviewed.
Actor Bonds, Actor Intentions, Conditioning and Relationship Context
The interaction between firms’ intentions and actor bonds presents a difficult matter for
research, for each conditions the other. Thus, the first part of this section presents an account
of ‘conditioning’ between firm intentions and actor bond formation, and this is followed by
elaboration of each of these constructs. Finally, the fourth part of this section elaborates the
need for examining actor intention and bonds in a relational coordination context.
Conditioning between Actor Bonds and Actor Intentions
The interaction of actor bonds and actor intentions for firms entering into relationships is a
complex matter, for interaction involves not only the knowing actor (Giddens, 1979), but also
the opportunity for emergence. The issue of emergence, how it occurs and definition of its
3limiting and generative factors will naturally remain a continuing IMP research stream,
however, it is not considered further here.
However, Giddens (1979) does provide an explanation of an element of the interaction
process: namely, the coincidental formation of actor bonds from firms’ intentions and the
conditioning of intention by actor bonds. Thus, the structure of actor bonds is at once formed
by the behaviour and intentions of the two firms, while concurrently providing a context for
the firms’ behaviour and intentions.
This elaboration of conditioning is based upon an important proposition, namely: the decision
to act remains within the firms and follows their intentions and strategy. Thus, while actor
bonds in a relationship provide additional options for tactics and strategy and network logic
limits available tactics and strategy, it is the intention and behaviour of the firms that forms
the actor bonds. If this is the case, then over the period of relationships it is the joint
intentions of the firms that guide formation of actor bonds. The next part considers actor
intentions in joining a relationship.
Actor Intentions
A business relationship represents a mutual alignment of self and collective interest (cf
Bengtsson and Kock, 1999; Young and Wilkinson, 1997). Firms enter into relationships with
suppliers, customers and significant partner organisations based on strategic plans (Axelsson
and Easton, 1992; Ford, 1990). These strategic plans represent a future orientation, founded
on the belief that long-term coordinated action with another firm is important. At the heart of
this strategy is an interest in maintaining future exchange based on expected net gains
(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh, 1987). From a firm’s perspective these gains need to be in the form
of economic goals. Thus, a firm’s self-interest is evident in the need for individual rewards as
a basis for motivation to join a relationship and continue to interact; while collective interest
is partially displayed by the way the other party mediates the collective rewards.
However, actor intentions alone do not limit a firm’s ability to manage a relationship over-
time for, as Giddens (1979) indicates, actors will have differing knowledge of their social
context. Thus, a firm’s past experience with acting collectively will also provide knowledge
and skills that will shape the coordination process between the firms (Wilson, 1995).
Furthermore, past experience of acting collectively must lead to formation of significantly
different actor bonds.
Actor Bonds
To-date, actor bonds have been characterised by the attributes of trust and commitment
(Håkansson and Snehota, 1995), yet these are but two of a range of attributes that may exist
within actor bonds. Thus, research should seek to extend the ability to characterise actor
bonds. Macneil’s (Macneil, 1980) contractual exchange theory offers a way to broaden actor
bond characteristics by providing a comprehensive approach to norms in market and non-
market situations. Norms are defined as “patterns of accepted and expected sentiments and
behaviour that are shared by members of an exchange system and have the force of social
obligation or pressure” (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer, 1995). As such, norms represent a
social structure, with Macneil (1980) distinguishing between market norms and the relational
norms required for on-going transactions. These relational norms, introduced shortly,
4represent a social structure within a relationship and so offer a means to extend actor bond
attributes.
However, two problems exist in applying relational norms in the actor bond context. First,
Macneil (1980) was only concerned with separating non-market norms from those that
operate in market situations, so it remains unclear how non-market norms might apply in
relationships as compared to other non-market contexts such as contractual-hierarchies
(Medlin, 2001). Considerable research remains before this problem may be resolved.
However, the present study presumes that all of Macneil’s non-market norms may be applied
to relationship contexts.
Second, there is considerable overlap of constructs (Wilson, 1995), so that it is difficult to
introduce relational norm constructs without re-definition. Table 1 provides an overview of
constructs by literature area and indicates their similarities, as well as displaying the
constructs used in this study. The naming of constructs in this study follows first the IMP
framework, then the inter-firm coordination literature and finally the terminology for
relational norms. Thus, Macneil’s (1980) relational norm of ‘mutuality’ (see table 1) is
equated to ‘trust’ based on the similarity of definitions, while the relational norm of
‘solidarity’ is associated with ‘commitment’. As there is no equivalent construct for the
relational norm of ‘role integrity’, in either IMP or inter-firm literature, this construct retains
Macneil’s (1980) term. Whereas, the relational norm of ‘propriety of means’ is
operationalised as ‘flexibility’, for this link with the inter-firm literature has been previously
made (Heide and John 1992). Similarly, ‘open communication’ has been previously
operationalised in the inter-firm literature (Heide and John 1992). Finally, Macneil’s (1980)
construct of ‘conflict harmonisation’ is retained, for by focusing on a proactive reduction of
conflict Macneil (1980), this represents more than use of power and influence on behalf of
self-interest.
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The relational coordination process necessarily exists within a specific business context,
where firms decide to work together to achieve results that neither could individually
generate. That is a relationship strategy, through interaction and emergence, necessarily
provides results that are either more, or less, than those anticipated by a single firm. This
means that performance of a relationship strategy must be measured at the relationship level,
for to measure the results at a firm level completely negates the purpose of the strategy.
However, very rarely has past quantitative research of relational coordination constructs been
based upon a relationship perspective (for some exception see Holm, Eriksson, and Johanson,
1996; Holm, Eriksson, and Johanson, 1999).
Collaborative Interest Model of Relational Coordination
The model of relational coordination presented here is composed of two sets of causal
linkages (I to II, II to III) and two different levels of aggregation: firms and relationship (see
figure 1). In the first section of the model (I), firms enter into business relationships to gain
access to the resources and relationships of their partner firms (Håkansson and Snehota,
1995). These basic motivations represent both self and collective interest, while the success
of a firm in accessing the resources of another depends in part on need, experience and ability
in the relationship building process. Together the strengths of these motivations and abilities
influence the extent of relational norm development within a specific dyad.
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* Note: The model is at two distinct aggregation levels: Firms (ie actor intention) and Relationship (ie relational
norms and performance).
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interact to provide the level of complexity and differentiation in time that is possible in a
relationship. While actor bonds and encompassed relational norms are not the only element of
inter-firm coordination, their overarching relationship level naturally provides for variations
in the coordination response that firms can make to environmental change and change within
the participating firms. Thus, relational norms act as mediating variables in explaining the
performance of relationships (ie section III). Higher development of relational norms implies
a more complex relationship and the potential to choose from a wider set of possible
responses so that a firm and a relationship have the potential to be more successful.
It is important to note that sections I and II of the model represent different levels of
aggregation, rather than different periods of time. Thus, sections I and II are coincident in
time, but at firm and relationship levels of aggregation respectively. In contrast, relationship
performance naturally represents an assessment over a period of time.
While it is clear that relational norms must develop from collective interest, the role of self-
interest in relationships remains complex. As a first step, in elucidating what is likely to be a
complex association, it is hypothesised that self-interest is positively linked to development
of relational norms and relationship performance.
Methodology
The complex interaction between self and collective interest in relationships is examined in
this study by operationalising collective interest as future orientation to the relationship and
the level of past experience in relationships, while self-interest is operationalised as the
economic goal of the firms in the target market. A firm’s economic goal is a measure distinct
from that of relationship performance in the target market. Relationship performance
recognises the results of joint action, whereas economic goal is focused on the intention of the
firm in entering the relationship. Thus, the economic goals of the firm reflect the self-interest
motive of the firm in entering a relationship, while performance is a measure of relationship
outcome.
As a result of these operationalisations it is possible to present specific hypotheses for testing
the collaborative interest model, according to the dependent variable (table 2 for relationship
performance, table 3 for relational norms). No hypotheses are presented for ‘open
communication’ or ‘conflict harmonisation’ as reliable indicators were not developed.
Table 2: Hypotheses for Relationship Performance

































The methodology chosen to test this model involved a survey of computer software firms
engaged in the export/import of business software using principal/distributor or
principal/agent relationships. This sample was chosen as the software industry uses
relationships and networks as the common modus operandi (Coviello, Ghauri, and Martin,
1998). A further benefit was the ease of measurement of relationship performance, the key
dependent variable, as market boundaries were clear to all respondents.
Table 3: Hypotheses for Relational Norms





























































In an initial step, a comprehensive list of software exporting firms (312 Australian, 175 New
Zealand) was obtained from a commercial database. A one-page facsimile was then used to
identify those firms involved in any type of distribution arrangement, ranging from
gentleman’s agreement to memorandums of understanding. This process resulted in a final
list of 128 Australian/New Zealand firms identified as having relationships with
Malaysian/Singaporean distributor/agent firms. Each firm in this sample was then contacted
and the person responsible for managing the Malaysian/Singapore relationships was
identified. The ability of the manager to be a key informant (Campbell, 1955) was established
and a qualification process applied to collectively nominate the partner firm in the other
country. Details of the manager on the other side of the relationship were also obtained.
Surveys were finally mailed to the key informants in both firms. Eventually, information on
83 relationships (from 45 principals and 38 agents/distributors) were collected and analysed,
representing a response rate of 32%. In this study, both sides of the principal/distributor
relationship have been included, but the dyad data has not been matched.
Results and Discussion
Measurement scales were prepared for constructs as a first step before analysis. Factor
analysis was conducted using the Maximum Likelihood method to reduce the number of
indicators for each construct (see table 4). During these analyses, the constructs of ‘open
communication’ and ‘conflict harmonisation’ were found un-admissible, as they represented
more than one factor and did not meet the requirement of a multi-normal distribution
8(Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1996). For hypotheses testing, the indicators for each construct are
summed to provide a single measure.
The results of examining the hypotheses using regression analyses are presented in table 5.
Hypothesis one was supported: economic goals explained 8.2% of variance in relationship
performance (p=0.009). Thus, self-interest plays, as expected, some part in explaining
relationship performance. Later results elucidate this association further.









study) 2 In the past we participated in relationships where the parties are willing to owe
each other favours.
0.810





2 Maintaining a long-term relationship with this partner is important to our firm. 0.942
1 For each goal (Market Share) indicate the relative importance to your firm’s




study) 2 For each goal (Market Share Growth) indicate the relative importance to your
firm’s overall strategy with regard to the focus relationship.
0.975
1 The other party is truly sincere in their promises. 0.926






3 Our partner is perfectly credible. 0.907
1 Our firm and the partner firm are very committed to each other. 0.944Commitment
(Aulakh et al.
1997; Holm et al.
1996) 2
The partner firm is very committed to our firm. 0.944
1 The exchange relationship with the partner firm has created a complex web of
interactions over all kinds of issues.
0.939





3 The exchange relationship with the partner firm has created a complex web of
interactions between us.
0.937
1 The parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship. 0.980Flexibility
(Heide and John,
1992) 2 The parties expect to be able to make adjustments to cope with changing
circumstances.
0.980
1 Consider all the costs and revenues with the focus relationship. Relative to your
firm’s expectations in the focus market, what has been the performance of the






2 Consider all the costs and revenues with the focus relationship. Relative to your
firm’s expectations in the focus market, what has been the performance of the
inter-firm relation on Market Share Growth.
0.985
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Table 5:  Regression Analyses results of Hypotheses One to Five
Sub Model A *
Hypotheses Dependent Variable Independent Variable/s R2 Stand ß Signif
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* Hypotheses are considered according to dependent variable: Model A – Relationship Performance, Model B – Relational Norms
In the second group of hypotheses trust and commitment (hypotheses 2a, 2b) explained
24.1% and 25.4% of relationship performance respectively (p=0.000 and p=0.000). This is
consistent with past research (Ganesan, 1994; Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Morgan and
Hunt, 1994).
However, the result concerning hypothesis 2c is interesting: no association was found
between role integrity and relationship performance. This is contrary to Macneil’s (1980)
theory of relational norms and, as such, is worthy of note. That role integrity is not
significantly correlated with trust, commitment, flexibility or relationship performance (see
appendix A) means that it may not play a part in the collaborative interest model of relational
coordination.
The association between flexibility and relationship performance (hypothesis 2d) was found
to be positive and significant. However, only 6.8% of relationship performance variance was
explained by flexibility. Given that flexibility is correlated with economic goals and
commitment (see appendix A), this result suggests that flexibility is likely to influence
11
relationship performance through some other mediating variable. The result concerning
hypothesis 2e further supports this inference.
Hypothesis 2e examines how the relational coordination constructs, in aggregate, explain
relationship performance. This was tested using stepwise-multiple regression, with variables
added and removed from analysis in steps according to their probability of F statistic (Coakes
and Steed, 1999). The result of this analysis was the removal of role integrity and flexibility,
so that trust and commitment remained to explain 30.5% of the variance in relationship
performance (p=0.006 and p=0.003 respectively). Thus, trust and commitment together
explained more variation in relationship performance, than either of the two alone.
Furthermore, the removal of flexibility adds weight to the argument that its impact upon
relationship performance is mediated by other variables.
Group three hypotheses examine the role of economic goals upon the relational norm
constructs. No significant association was found between economic goals and trust or
commitment, suggesting that self-interest does not directly influence the development of
these two central constructs of relational coordination.
However, economic goals explained 8% of variance of role integrity (p=0.010). This, in
conjunction with previous results, suggests that the role integrity construct and/or related
theory require further examination. That role integrity is associated with the self-interest of
the firm, may also suggest that integration is only carried as far as needed to achieve the
firm’s ends. If this is so, then role integrity is not part of relational coordination.
With regard to the association between economic goals and flexibility (Hypothesis 3d) a
significant result is found (p=0.035), but with only 5.4% of variance explained. That this
association is significant is important, however, for it appears to indicate that flexibility is
aligned with self-interest. Thus, firms are flexible when they need to be, rather than as a
means of pursuing joint interest.
Group four hypotheses examine the role of past experience with joint action upon the
development of relational norm. Hypothesis 4a was unsupported. Past experience with joint
action does not lead to trust in the present relationship. On the other hand, testing of
Hypothesis 4b found a significant and positive association between past experience and
commitment to the present relationship, with 13.5% of variance being explained (p=0.000).
This provides empirical evidence for Wilson’s (1995) suggestion that level of experience
influences the ability of parties to form relationships.
Testing of Hypothesis 4c found no significant association between past experience and role
integrity. Thus, it appears that experience with past joint action, contrary to theoretical
expectations, does not lead to higher levels of integration in the present relationship. For past
experience and flexibility (Hypothesis 4d) only a weak association was found. This result
suggests that past experience with joint activity in other relationships has only a marginal
influence on flexibility in the current relationship.
Group five hypotheses examine the role of future orientation (ie the strategic importance of
the relationship) upon the relational norm constructs. Hypothesis 5a is supported with 17.5%
of variance in trust explained by future orientation (p=0.000). The importance of future
orientation upon the development of commitment (hypothesis 5b) is also significant
(p=0.000), with 28% of variance in commitment being explained.
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Testing of Hypothesis 5c found no significant association between future orientation and role
integrity. This is surprising for one would expect the importance of a relationship strategy to
lead to higher levels of role integrity between two firms. This is an important result,
especially given the association between role integrity and economic goals. It suggests that
the role integrity construct and the related theory deserve closer attention. One possibility is
that role integrity is associated with forms of hierarchical coordination.
With regard to the association between future orientation and flexibility (hypothesis 5d) a
significant result was found (p=0.000) with 19.1% of variance explained. This is interesting
when considered in conjunction with the previously discussed association between economic
goals and flexibility. Together, these results suggest that flexibility is a consequence of self-
interest and the importance of the relationship to the firm.
In conclusion, the proposition that future orientation leads to higher levels of relational norm
development is supported with regard to development of trust, commitment and flexibility.
This is an important result: future orientation is clearly found to be an antecedent of the two
known relational coordination variables: trust and commitment. However, as flexibility is not
associated with trust and the association with commitment is significant, but not strong, this
result in conjunction with support for Hypothesis 3c tends to suggest that flexibility is linked
more closely with self-interest or is an antecedent of relational coordination. If flexibility is
more closely aligned with self-interest then it is not an element of relational coordination.
The next part of this section summarises these results by conducting path analyses between
self and collective interest constructs and relationship performance.
Path Analysis
Path analysis allows comparison of linked causal paths. This is achieved by multiplying the
coefficients of constructs found to be significant in causal paths (Asher, 1976). Table 6
presents the indirect coefficients for the causal paths explaining relationship performance.
These results may be summarised by dichotomising relational coordination based on
collective interests with coordination based on self-interest. Thus, paths with either trust or
commitment represent relational coordination, while all other paths would indicate
coordination based on self-interest. With this interpretation, relational coordination (shaded in
table 6) is clearly more important in explaining relationship performance than is self-interest.
Table 6: Indirect Coefficients for Main Causal Paths to Relationship Performance
Causal Path Indirect coefficient
Future orientation ---> Trust ---> Relationship performance 0.211
Future orientation ---> Commitment ---> Relationship performance 0.271
Past experience ---> Commitment ---> Relationship performance 0.192
Past experience ---> Flexibility ---> Relationship performance 0.059
Future orientation ---> Flexibility ---> Relationship performance 0.117
Economic goal ---> Flexibility ---> Relationship performance 0.061
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Discussion
These results indicate for the first time the relative importance of relational coordination vis-
à-vis coordination based on self-interest in the structuring of relationships, indicating that
future research should continue to focus on the role of trust and commitment in relationships.
One of the most interesting results in relation to testing the collaborative interest model is the
more complex association between flexibility and the constructs for self-interest, future
orientation and relationship performance. First, that the level of a firm’s future orientation to
a relationship, and economic goals, leads to greater flexibility seems to indicate a role for this
construct in balancing of self and collective interest. Further, that a greater proportion of
variance in flexibility is explained by future orientation than by economic goals (19.1%
compared to 5.4%) seems to suggest that flexibility is more closely related to self-interest that
is embedded within collective interest. Yet, flexibility does not add significantly to the
explanation of relationship performance when included in a regression analysis alongside
commitment and trust. This would seem to indicate that flexibility might be related to some
other aspect of relationship performance, possibly at a firm or strategic level. This points to a
need for future research to account for a firm and relationship perspective, where self and
collective interest provide two complementary elements of relational coordination.
Future research
Future research using the collaborative interest model of relational coordination must
naturally be composed of two inter-locking issues: self-interest and collaborative interests.
The first issue should see the self-interest aspect of relationships developed beyond the simple
association between economic goals, flexibility and relationship performance portrayed in
this study. This would involve elucidation of the ways that resource ties and activity links
respond to different sets of actor intentions and actor bonds. In addition, the self-interest
aspect of relationships may also involve the conflict harmonisation construct as the mediator
of self and collective interest.
Conversely, the second issue requires elaboration of the linkages between trust, commitment
and relationship performance. Presumably, this research will result in the integration of
resource ties and activity links into the collaborative interest model, for it seems that
interaction between these relationship elements must explain relationship performance.
However, the argument and research evidence presented here suggests that resource ties and
activity links must be examined on the basis of both self and collective interest, if their
interaction is to be understood.
The possibilities in this program of future research suggest that the concepts of self and
collective interest within a collaborative interest model of relationships, where performance is
conceptualised at a dyadic and also firm level, may offer important insights into the operation
and management of business relationships.
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Appendix A: Correlation Matrix of Final Indicators
P_EXP F_ORIENT GOAL TRUST COMM R_INT FLEX PERF
P_EXP Pearson Correlation 1.000 .294 ** -.033 .200 .381 ** .057 .227 * .082
Sig. (2-tailed) . .007 .765 .070 .000 .609 .039 .461
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
F_ORIENT Pearson Correlation .294  ** 1.000 .374 ** .430 ** .537 ** .075 .449 ** .461 **
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 . .001 .000 .000 .498 .000 .000
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
GOAL Pearson Correlation -.033 .374 ** 1.000 .093 .183 .282 ** .232 * .287 **
Sig. (2-tailed) .765 .001 . .404 .097 .010 .035 .009
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
TRUST Pearson Correlation .200 .430 ** .093 1.000 .539 ** -.146 .180 .491 **
Sig. (2-tailed) .070 .000 .404 . .000 .188 .103 .000
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
COMM Pearson Correlation .381 ** .537 ** .183 .539 ** 1.000 .057 .242 * .504 **
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .097 .000 . .606 .027 .000
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
R_INT Pearson Correlation .057 .075 .282 ** -.146 .057 1.000 -.056 -.022
Sig. (2-tailed) .609 .498 .010 .188 .606 . .616 .845
Sig. (2-tailed) .609 .498 .010 .188 .606 . .616 .845
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
FLEX Pearson Correlation .227 * .449 ** .232 * .180 .242 * -.056 1.000 .261 *
FLEX Pearson Correlation .227 * .449 ** .232 * .180 .242 * -.056 1.000 .261 *
Sig. (2-tailed) .039 .000 .035 .103 .027 .616 . .017
Sig. (2-tailed) .039 .000 .035 .103 .027 .616 . .017
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
PERF Pearson Correlation .082 .461 ** .287 ** .491 ** .504 ** -.022 .261 * 1.000
PERF Pearson Correlation .082 .461 ** .287 ** .491 ** .504 ** -.022 .261 * 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .461 .000 .009 .000 .000 .845 .017 .
Sig. (2-tailed) .461 .000 .009 .000 .000 .845 .017 .
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
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**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level     *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
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